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ACE VS. CBIT: WHICH IS BETTER FOR 





This paper analyses the switch to an ACE or to a CBIT type of tax system starting from the 
present German tax system. We show that in case an ACE type of reform is financed by an 
increase in the VAT and not in the profit tax, it might be preferred to a CBIT even in the 
context of an open economy. Moreover, the required exogenous increase in the profit tax rate 
cannot ensure revenue neutrality on its own due to the negative general equilibrium effects it 
triggers on the whole economy. For a CBIT, the exogenous reduction in the tax rates on 
corporate and non-corporate profits leads to better results than when we allow for an 
endogenous change in the VAT. The best results arise when the CBIT is accompanied by a 
provision for immediate write-off and a lower profit tax or when the ACE with no additional 
capital gains taxation on the household side is financed by an increase in the VAT. 
JEL Code: C68, D58, D92, E62, H25. 
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Since in most countries the tax law provides for a deduction of debt interest when com-
puting the proﬁt tax base, debt ﬁnance is at an advantage compared to ﬁnancing an
investment via retained earnings. In order to equalize the opportunity cost of debt and
equity, tax professionals have designed two polar reform proposals, namely the Compre-
hensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) and the Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE)1 to
counteract this problem. The CBIT was developed by the US Treasury Department
at the beginning of the nineties whereas the ACE was elaborated by the IFS Capital
Taxes Group (1991) at the same time.
Under the former reform proposal neither the incurred interest on debt nor any im-
puted return on equity may be deducted against the proﬁt tax base. As opposed to this,
the second reform proposal, the ACE, provides in addition to the deduction of incurred
interest on debt for the deduction of an imputed return on equity capital against the proﬁt
tax base of a ﬁrm (Bond, 2000; Cnossen, 2000; Devereux and Freeman, 1991). Ac-
cordingly, compared to the present tax systems enforced in all OECD countries,2 the user
cost of capital for a debt ﬁnanced investment would increase under the CBIT proposal,
whereas the user cost of capital for an investment ﬁnanced by internal equity could be
reduced under the ACE.
In this paper we develop a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to analyze the
implications of these two reform proposals with regard to the ﬁrms’ investment behavior
and households’ welfare. To our knowledge, a comparative quantitative assessment of the
eﬃciency and welfare aspects of these two reform proposals within the framework of a
dynamic CGE model is lacking. Our paper tries to ﬁll this gap by ﬁrst comparing the
neutrality properties and second by computing the eﬃciency and welfare eﬀects arising
from each of the two reform alternatives.3 The applied CGE model resembles a two
1For a detailed discussion on the ACE see Boadway and Bruce (1984) and Devereux and Free-
man (1991).
2In all OECD countries incurred interest on debt is deductible aginst taxable corporate proﬁts, whereas
the opportunity cost of equity capital does not face any favorable tax treatment in any OECD country.
(OECD ,1991)
3There exists a study by Fehr and Wiegard (2003) which assesses the impact of introducing an
1country model where the home country consists of a two sector economy and an inﬁnitively
lived agent on the household side.4 Moreover, given the present discussions in diﬀerent
countries which aim at reforming the tax system one way or the other, this topic seems to
be an up-to-date issue. On the one hand, in Germany, the German Council of Economic
Advisors (GCEA) (2005, 2006) suggested introducing a combination of a Dual Income
Tax with an ACE and for Switzerland, Keuschnigg (2005) also designed a growth oriented
Dual Income Tax which also features an ACE. On the other hand, the ruling coalition’s
most recent reform proposal (Bundesﬁnanzministerium 2006) advances the idea of a lower
corporate tax of 30 per cent and the partial abolition of debt interest deductibility thus
moving in the direction of a CBIT. In addition, a similar idea was also put forward in
the US by the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform (2006) who proposed for the
taxation of large businesses a proﬁt tax of 30 per cent and the abolishment of debt interest
deductibility.5
Based on the premise that each tax reform should be implemented on a revenue neutral
basis, the introduction of the ACE requires either an increase in the corporate income tax
rate, an increase in another tax such as the VAT or a reduction in government transfers
since it envisages a narrower tax base compared to the currently existing tax systems.
As opposed to the introduction of an ACE, under the CBIT, the corporate tax rate
can under certain circumstances even be reduced due to the broader tax base which this
proposal brings about.
When performing the simulations, we also rely on an adjustment in the VAT rate -
instead, or in addition to, the change in the corporate tax rate - to assure revenue neu-
trality under each of the two reform proposals. According to the above predictions, the
simulations results show, in case the ACE/ACNE6 (Allowance for corporate and non-
ACE in Germany, however it just considers this reform alternative and not a CBIT as well. Moreover, the
model applied by these authors is an OLG model and it does not distinguish between ﬁrms of diﬀerent
legal form and does not feature an endogeneous portfolio choice by households.
4Currently, the CGE model is calibrated to the German economy. A detailed model documentation
can be received on request from the authors.
5The present US tax code allows for debt interest deductibility and there are 8 tax brackets the lowest
of 15 per cent and the highest of 39 per cent which apply to large businesses (The President’s Advisory
Panel on Tax Reform 2005).
6Since IFOMod, the dynamic CGE model applied here features both corporate and non-corporate
2corporate equity) is ﬁnanced by an exogenous increase in the tax rates on corporate and
non-corporate proﬁts, the additional tax revenue collected is not suﬃcient to ﬁnance the
reform. Therefore, the reform proposal needs to be accompanied either by an additional
reduction in transfers or increase in the VAT rate. This outcome occurs since within the
framework of our dynamic general equilibrium model, the tremendous rise in the proﬁt
tax rate has considerable negative economy-wide repercussions leading to capital decu-
mulation and a shrinking tax base for all other taxes as well. These kind of second order
eﬀects accompanying any tax reform can only be determined by dynamic CGE models
and are increasingly important to ensure a tax reform is undertaken in a sustainable way.
The simulations of the CBIT show that the exogenous decline in the corporate tax
rate which may accompany such a reform has signiﬁcant positive eﬀects and leads to
better results in economic growth and welfare. Overall, the policy reforms which have
t h em o s ts i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀects on macroeconomic variables and welfare are ﬁrst the
CBIT combined with a provision for immediate write-oﬀ. Under this scenario, the capital
stock and labour demand increase triggering an increase in long-run GDP by around 10
per cent. Second, the ACE/ACNE with no additional capital gains taxation on household
level also produces positive welfare results. Here, the long run capital stock increases by
20.5 per cent leading to a signiﬁcant upward swing in GDP by 9.1 per cent. To ensure
a comparable treatment of diﬀerent types of capital income on household level we also
consider scenarios which apply a capital gains tax as well. These simulations however, as
well as the CBIT with no special depreciation allowances do not perform well and even
lead to welfare losses.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows: The next Section presents
a thorough comparison of the two fundamental reform alternatives. Section three then
develops the general equilibrium model with special focus on the investment and ﬁnancial
behavior of corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms under these two reform proposals. Section
four presents the simulation results and detailed economic interpretations, in Section ﬁve
we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the most important parameters and the
ﬁrms, we extend the allowance for equity to non-corporate ﬁrms to ensure an equal treatment of equity
across ﬁrms of diﬀerent legal form.
3last Section concludes.
2A C E v s . C B I T
The ACE was elaborated by the IFS Capital Taxes Group in 1991, however, the idea
of considering an imputed interest on equity was ﬁrst advanced by Boadway and Bruce
in 1984. The reformers introduced the idea of such a tax system since they considered
several shortcomings of the British tax system of that time. First, omitting the cost of
equity ﬁnance drives a wedge between the pre- and post-tax returns of an investment
ﬁnanced by equity. Therefore, investments that do not provide suﬃcient returns which
cover both the tax bill and oﬀer the investor at least the market rate of return, will
n o tb et a k e ni n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o n( IFS Capital Taxes Group 1991).7 Moreover, by
still providing for debt interest deductibility, there continues to exist a bias in favor of
debt-ﬁnanced investments (Bond, 2000).
This reform was even introduced in Croatia between 1994 and 2001 such that we can
speak of not only a theoretical concept but of something that has been tried in practice
as well ( Keen and King 2002).
Thus, in a closed economy, by introducing an ACE, the cost of capital for an investment
ﬁnanced via retained ea r n i n g si sr e d u c e d( Bond, 2000) and as long as the deducted costs
of equity and debt ﬁnance are equal, there is no particular advantage for one of the two
sources of ﬁnance. Under these circumstances the ACE is favoured relative to the CBIT
since it reduces the overall cost of capital of the ﬁrm.
In addition, the ACE in its pure form would also require that interest income is
tax exempt at the personal level, such that this kind of tax system is equivalent to
ac a s h - ﬂow income tax89 (Lammersen, 2002; Wagner, 1999; Fehr and Wiegard
7Additionally, since at the beginning of the nineties, British companies still relied on the historical cost
accounting method for reporting proﬁts, the eﬀect of inﬂation was to increase the tax base in nominal
terms such that the burden of taxation increased (IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991)
8Under the cash ﬂow tax, investment expenditures can be immediately written oﬀ when they are
undertaken (Boadway and Bruce, 1984).
9For the simulation exercise we, however, disregard this issue and just consider the deduction of
41999, Devereux and Freeman, 1991). In essence, a pure ACE will exempt the cost
of raising ﬁnance at the company level from taxation and will just subject the proﬁts
exceeding a ‘normal rate of return’ to taxation (IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991).
The implementation of such a tax system, however, poses some diﬃculties since a large
amount of information is required about which interest rate should be imputed (Boadway
and Bruce 1984, Bond and Devereux 1999).10 Moreover, ﬁnancial neutrality is only
guaranteed under the ACE if the imputed rate of return on equity capital equals the
interest rate paid on debt. In case the protective interest rate exceeds the interest rate
paid on debt, non-proﬁtable investment projects might even be subsidized under the ACE.
Such an outcome would be similar to the eﬀects resulting from accelerated depreciation.
On a theoretical basis, if the imputed rate of return on equity capital is, however, chosen
appropriately, intertemporal and investment neutrality is achieved since the post- and
pre-tax rates of return are adjusted (IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991). In this case
the households’ rate of time preference will equal the marginal product of capital.11
An additional question to be asked in this context regards the issue whether the ACE
should be extended such as to apply to self-employed as well. In this constellation, some
diﬃculties might arise since it is problematic to distinguish which assets belong to the
company and which to the shareholder (Isaac, 1997). Considering the deﬁnition of the
equity to be deducted, this could be measured for instance as the book value of assets net
of debt (Devereux and Freeman, 1991). Regarding the viability of such a tax system
in a world of high capital mobility, e.g. for outward investments by German companies
abroad, an ACE would just apply to remitted and distributed proﬁts to Germany. In the
case of inward investment, for countries which apply the exemption system for double tax
relief, things would not change to a large extent while in countries which apply the tax
credit system (like the US), the taxpayer would have to pay the diﬀerence to the higher
a protective interest rate on equity capital, since we are just interested in comparing the two reform
proposals with respect to their investment incentives and revenue implications. To ensure interest income
and earnings on ﬁrm shares are treated in a similar way at household level we perform diﬀerent simulations
which also allow for the taxation of capital gains on household level.
10The IFS Tax Group favors in this case a medium-term gilt (IFS Capital Taxes Group, 1991).
11In our simulations however, a tax on interest income still aplies such that only investment but not
intertemporal neutrality will be guaranteed.
5tax bill.12 As also noted by the IFS Capital Taxes Group (1991), the ACE system
would tend to favour domestic investment because of the neutrality of the domestic tax
system versus the non-neutrality of other countries’ systems.
A controversial aspect emerges if we consider the fact that the ACE basically just
taxes economic rents. Therefore, ﬁrms which earn just or less than the minimum required
return would pay little or even no tax, while the most proﬁtable enterprises will face
the highest tax bill since they earn the highest returns. Clearly, it is debatable whether
such a situation is desirable, mostly if we consider multinational companies to be usually
t h em o s tp r o ﬁtable ones (Bond, 2000). In this context, the question might arise, why
one would not think of simply reducing the statutory tax rate, thus providing a clear
and simple signal to international investors. However, just reducing the statutory tax
rate would not really address the issue of achieving neutrality with regard to the source
of ﬁnance since debt ﬁnance would continue to be at an advantage compared to equity
ﬁnance.
The main critique raised with regard to the ACE addresses the fact that the narrowing
of the tax base has to be accompanied by a higher tax rate to achieve a certain tax
revenue (Isaac, 1997). Such an outcome is less desirable in a world of high capital
mobility where a higher statutory tax rate has a negative signalling eﬀect for multinational
ﬁrms. Nevertheless, because of the limitation of the imputation system under the IFS
Capital Taxes Group (1991) proposal, additional revenue can be achieved from taxing
distributed proﬁts at the personal level. Under a full imputation system, the tax on all
proﬁts can be credited against the shareholder’s personal income tax, while under the
new proposal only the tax paid on the normal rate of return can be credited against the
shareholder’s personal tax bill. Using an average of real revenues over the period 1971-
1990, Devereux and Freeman (1991) compute a revenue-neutral tax rate of 45 per
cent, which is about ten percentage points higher compared to the prevailing tax rate in
t h eU Ka tt h a tt i m e .
12See also Isaac (1997) fot the discussion on the eﬀect of the ACE on inward and outward investment
in the case of the UK.
6Lastly, a further main advantage of such a tax system, is that any schedule of de-
preciation allowances, i.e. providing for an immediate write-oﬀ or allowing for geometric
digressive depreciation over the life of an asset - does not change the present value of
tax payments (Devereux and Freeman,1 9 9 1a n dBruckner, Gassner, Riener-
Micheler 2000). Allowing for accelerated depreciation for instance reduces on the one
hand the tax base of the proﬁt tax in the current period. On the other hand it also reduces
the accounting stock of capital and thus the base which is multiplied with the protective
interest to compute the ACE in the next period (Keen and King, 2002). Therefore,
such a reform increases the eﬃciency of a tax system. In contrast, under a conventional
corporate tax system, the tax depreciation promotes tax savings such that the shadow
price of capital also depends on the depreciation system in place (Fehr and Wiegard,
2003).
Regarding the treatment of risk and risky projects, the deduction of the imputed
return on equity capital under the ACE reduces the volatility of the expected return.
This is true, since the reduced expected return of shareholders is exactly compensated by
the reduced risk they bear. Accordingly, the government acts like a silent partner which
shares both the return and some of the risk of a project (Devereux and Freeman
1991).
As opposed to the ACE proposal, the other reform alternative considered here, the
CBIT, developed by the US Treasury Department (1992), raises the cost of capital
for a debt ﬁnanced investment since the incurred interest on debt is no longer deductible
when computing the proﬁt tax base.
Even though this reform induces a higher capital cost, it might be advisable for a
government to adopt it if it can apply a lower proﬁt tax rate due to the broader tax base
(Cnossen, 2000). This is especially the case for a small open economy characterized by
high capital mobility. Nevertheless, this line of arguments only holds if we assume that in
order to achieve a given amount of government revenue, just the proﬁtt a xr a t ec a na n d
thus has to be altered. However, under the assumption that such reforms can also be
ﬁnanced by a change in the VAT (so by an increase in case of an ACE), it is not clear-cut
7that the CBIT is to be preferred in case of a small open economy, if a country wants
to attract investors both by oﬀering low statutory tax rates and a narrow tax base for
corporate proﬁts.
3 The Model
The following section introduces a detailed description of the dynamic CGE model which
is applied to assess the quantitative impact of introducing the ACE/ACNE or the CBIT
reform proposal.13
3.1 Production
Optimal investment behavior of both corporate (C) and non-corporate (N) ﬁrms is derived
from an intertemporal investment model with convex adjustment costs. Moreover, since
we mainly focus on the eﬀects of the tax reform on welfare, we model the household sector
using the traditional Ramsey model of an inﬁnitely lived agent.14 Beside the government,
the Rest of the World (RoW) is the model’s fourth building block which completes the
general equilibrium framework.
We start with a basic neoclassical, linear homogenous production technology, Y f =
F(Kf,L f), with capital, K and labour, L, as input factors.15 The price of the output
good, Y f, is normalized to unity and additionally, each ﬁrm incurs adjustment costs of
Jf(If,Kf) representing declining marginal returns of capital formation.16
13The model does not yet incorporate multinational ﬁrms and cross country ownership of ﬁrm equity.
Thus, the welfare eﬀects under the present constellation assume that resident taxpayers are the owners
of the ﬁrms and we thus also abstract from the tax competition issue at this stage. The theoretical
arguments of the eﬀects of an ACE in case of countries applying the crediting or the exemption method
can be found in Isaac (1997). Isaac (1997) also gives a broad overview on how other countries might
react if a country like the UK would decide to move to an ACE type of tax system.
Moreover, in case of multinational ﬁrms which can decide to locate their production elsewhere and
export to the domestic markets, Bond (2000) shows that a tax on rents like the ACE, can be avoided.
Therefore, even if such a tax does not aﬀect the cost of capital since it only falls on economic rents, if it
is too high, it will be avoided by multinational ﬁrms, thus deterring domestic investment (Bond, 2000)
14The complete model documentation can be received on request from the authors.
15The superscript f ∈{C =corporate, NC =non-corporate} denotes the type of a particular ﬁrm.
16The adjustment cost function is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in investments, I and capital, K
8Both ﬁrm types hire labour and accumulate capital to maximize their value. Thereby,
corporate proﬁts are subject to double taxation, ﬁrst, by the proﬁtt a x ,τP,C,w h i c hi s
levied on ﬁrm level and thereafter on personal level by the dividend tax, τD,i nc a s eo f
distributed proﬁts17 or by the capital gains tax, τG,f,i nc a s eo fp r o ﬁtr e t e n t i o n .P r o ﬁts
of non-corporate ﬁrms are taxed only once, namely at the personal level at the income
tax rate, τP,N,o ft h eﬁrm owner.
Capital accumulates over time whenever gross investment, I
f
t , exceeds the depreciation







t +( 1− δ)K
f
t . (1)
Concerning debt policy, we assume that interest payments on debt include an addi-
tional premium m(bf), e.g. agency cost of debt, which is a function of the debt capital
ratio, bf = Bf/Kf,o ft h eﬁrm. These agency costs are increasing in bf,r e ﬂecting the
larger risk of bankruptcy prevailing, if the debt capital ratio of a ﬁrm rises and therewith








Thus, next period’s stock of debt, B
f
t+1, is given by the existing stock of debt, B
f




The next equation shows net of tax proﬁts π
f
t deﬁned as output Y
f
t , less adjustment
costs J
f




t , interest and agency cost on debt (iBH
t +
and convex in investment. In the steady state adjustment costs are zero such that they do not inﬂuence
the steady state solution.
17According to the German "Halbeinkünfteverfahren", dividends, D,a r eﬁrst taxed on the ﬁrm level
and then half of distributed dividends are once again taxed on the personal level. To account for this
imputation system, we take only half of the statutory tax rate applied to dividend income for the simu-
lations. Moreover, eﬀectively there is no capital gains tax in Germany but the variable, tG,f, is carried
along for reasons of completeness.
18The growth factor G =( 1+g), enters the model as we allow for an exogenous trend growth in labour
productivity at rate g. Thus, in a balanced growth equilibrium the capital stock as well as all other
variables grow at the rate g.
19The agency cost of debt, m = m(bf), are strictly concave implying that the ﬁrst and second derivative,
m0(bf) > 0 and m00(bf),a r ep o s i t i v e .
9mf)B
f
t and the tax liability of the ﬁrm T
P,f
t :





τP,f [Y f − Jf − wfLf − δKf − mfBf
−z1iBHBf − z2iE(Kf − Bf) − z3INf].
(3)
Hence, τP,f has to be interpreted as a source tax on corporate proﬁts. The tax parameters
z1 and z2 denote whether the incurred interest on debt and equity capital is tax deductible
or not. In case both parameters are set to zero, z1 = z2 =0 , neither the interest on debt
nor the imputed return on equity, denoted by iE are tax deductible, as proposed under
the CBIT. As opposed to that, if we set z1 = z2 =1 , we model an ACE/ACNE since both
the interest on debt and the imputed return on equity are tax deductible. The imputed
return is multiplied with the value of the ﬁrm’s equity, namely Kf − Bf . Under the
present German tax rules z1 =1and z2 =0holds, implying that only interest payments
on debt are tax deductible. The other tax parameter z3 represents the tax allowances for
net investments INf20.
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t , or externally via new debt, BN
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t .A c c o r d i n g l y















t .( 4 )
Ac o r p o r a t eﬁrm can draw on all of the above mentioned three sources of ﬁnance. In case
of a non-corporate ﬁrm however, all proﬁts are distributed, πN
t = DivN
t , such that the
marginal investment needs to be ﬁnanced either by new share issues or new debt.
Finally, the net of tax return on corporate and non-corporate equity is given by net
20If z3 = 0 we have the case of economic depreciation. If z3 = 1 we allow for a full immediate write-oﬀ
and and τP,f can be interpreted as a cash-ﬂow tax.
21We assume that replacement investments are always ﬁnanced internally.
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Of course, for non-corporate ﬁrms no dividend tax applies.
3.2 Intertemporal Optimization
The ﬁrms of each sector seek to maximize their value and therefore choose their intertem-
poral pattern of labor demand, investment and new debt optimally. Thereby, the ﬁrm
value V f will increase with the size of the capital stock accumulated and fall with the level
of debt inherited from the past. At the beginning of each planning period, t, the capital
stock and level of debt are, however, exogenous, as they are historically predetermined























The variable θ denotes a tax factor which is deﬁned as ‘one minus the respective tax rate’.
Hence, the end of period market value of a ﬁrm is determined by the present value of all
future net of tax dividend payments less new equity injections. The net dividend ﬂow is
discounted at the cost of equity, ref = rV f/(1 − τG,f), which is the required gross return
on ﬁrm level.
Using the value function, and assuming that investment is optimized from period
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s.t. (1) and (2).
(7)
22Caution, the variable V
f







t refers to the end of period ﬁrm value.












t ,r e -
spectively,23 as well as the following three tax parameters for corporate and non-corporate
ﬁrms:
(a) γD,C = θD,CθP,C







(1 − z3τP,C) γI,N =1 − τP,N z3
θG,N
(c) ΩC = θD,C
θG,C ΩN =1
(8)






























Optimal labor demand is determined by the equality between the marginal product of
labor F
f
L,t and the labor cost w
f
t . In equilibrium, the wage rate is determined endogenously
such that it clears the labor market. Optimality condition (9b) delivers the condition
which describes the ﬁrm’s optimal investment policy: Optimal investment thus equates the
present value of the marginal beneﬁt arising from one additional unit of capital installed,
namely q
f
t+1,24 with the marginal cost incurred for carrying out this investment which is
given by γD,fJ
f








for a corporate ﬁrm and θ
P,N/θ
G,NJN
I +1for a non-corporate
ﬁrm.25
23The shadow prices determine the increase in the value of the objective function resulting from a
marginal increase in the stock variables capital or debt.
24The derived shadow prices for capital and debt are ‘end of period shadow prices’, since they resemble
the derivative of the end of period ﬁrm values w.r.t. the stock variables capital and debt. These end of
period shadow prices can easily be transformed into ‘beginning of period’ shadow price by applying the








25Assuming there is no accelerated depreciation so z3 =0and there are no new share issues available
to ﬁnance marginal investments, so β =0 .
12T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sc o n c e r n i n gt h es t o c kv a r i a b l e sc a p i t a la n dd e b ta r e :

























(b) Bf : λ
e,f
t = γD,f[−mf − m0
fbf − 1−z1τP,f









These equations enable us to determine the cost of capital which inﬂuences the investment
decision of the ﬁrm as well as the cost of equity and debt ﬁnance which determine a ﬁrm’s
ﬁnancing behavior. These behavioral margins are discussed in detail in the following
sections.
3.3 Financial Behavior
Performing a comparative static analysis allows us to derive basic insights about the
economic eﬀects arising from the two proposed tax reform scenarios. In the following, we
compute the eﬀect of a marginal change in one tax rate on the marginal product of capital
and the cost of equity, respectively, to examine how these changes in the tax rates aﬀect
the investment and ﬁnancial behavior of ﬁrms. To start with, the ﬁnancial behavior of
ﬁr m si sc o n s i d e r e d .
A c c o r d i n gt ot h eModigliani Miller Theorem (1958), the market value of a ﬁrm
is independent of its capital structure in the absence of taxation.26 I nt h ep r e s e n c eo f
taxes and agency costs, however, the diﬀerent tax constellations create a preference for a
speciﬁcs o u r c eo fﬁnance.
The optimal level of a ﬁrm’s indebtedness is achieved if the cost of equity ﬁnance equals
t h ec o s to fd e b tﬁnance. Substituting eq.(9c) into the envelope condition for the co-state






















26In addition, the following three conditions have to be fulﬁl l e ds u c ht h a tt h eModigliani Miller
Theorem holds: (1) perfect markets (i.e. no taxes or transaction costs), (2) cash ﬂows that are independent
of ﬁnancial structure and (3) risk less debt such that ﬁrms and individuals can borrow and lend at a risk
free interest rate.
13C-Firm: rV C

















The striking diﬀerence between the two cost of equity formulae for the two ﬁrm types is
that the capital gains tax rate does not aﬀect the cost of equity of non-corporate ﬁrms.
This is so because non-corporate ﬁrms can not draw on retained earnings as a marginal
source of ﬁnance, and accordingly the capital gains tax rate does not inﬂuence the ﬁnancial
decision.
If debt and equity are treated equally on the personal level, then both have to yield
t h es a m ep r e t a xr e t u r n ,n a m e l yref = iBH.
However, if a proﬁt tax applies, debt ﬁnancing incorporates the advantage of interest
deductibility on corporate level, in case z1 =1 , inducing a preference for debt ﬁnance
in the size of τP,fiBH. Since the larger indebtedness increases the debt asset ratio, bf,
additional agency cost of m0
fbf + mf arise, reducing the advantage of debt ﬁnance.
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h ea b o v ee q u a t i o ni st h ee ﬀective cost of equity which is lower
if we introduce an ACE/ACNE, implying z2 =1 . Therefore, both the cost of equity and
the cost of debt depend on whether debt interest and/or an imputed return on equity are
tax deductible from the proﬁtt a xo rn o t .
In case a CBIT is implemented, then both z1 and z2 equal zero and neither the cost
of debt ﬁnance nor the cost of equity ﬁnance are tax deductible. Under that constellation




























From Figure 1 we can see that abolishing the possibility to deduct debt interest from
the proﬁt tax base increases the cost of debt ﬁnance, while the cost of equity remains
unchanged. If a preference of debt ﬁnance prevailed, this is now reduced. Accordingly,
14less debt will be incurred resulting in a lower debt asset ratio. The optimal debt asset
ratio moves to the left, to b0.
Figure 1: Change of the Optimal Debt Asset Ratio under CBIT
A similar neutrality property with respect to the source of ﬁnance is also achieved in
case the policy reform follows an ACE/ACNE. Under this scenario both z1 and z2 equal




























As we can see from eq. (13) introducing the possibility to deduct an imputed return
from the tax base lowers the cost of equity. Accordingly, in Figure 2 the horizontal line
depicting the cost of equity shifts downwards whereas the upward sloping cost of debt
remains unchanged. Thus, if an ACE/ACNE is introduced the optimal debt asset ratio
declines from initially b∗ to b0.
15Figure 2: Change of the Optimal Debt Asset Ratio under ACE/ACNE
Moreover, in the case of an ACE/ACNE, the preference for a particular source of
ﬁnance also depends on the magnitude of the imputed rate of return, iE. Neutrality is
achieved only insofar as iE = iBH so when the imputed return equals the interest rate
paid on debt (see eq. (13). The higher iE will be, the lower the cost of equity and the
higher will then the incentive be to draw on retentions to ﬁnance investments vis-a-vis
new debt.
In Figure 3, the initial debt asset ratio is denoted by b∗. If we allow for an increase
in the imputed return which can be deducted from the tax base , iE0 >i E,t h ec o s to f
equity will decline further implying a downward shift of the horizontal cost of equity line.
Consequently, the optimal debt asset ratio shrinks to b0.
To evaluate the eﬀects of a marginal change in the tax rates on the ﬁnancial decision of
a ﬁrm, we analyze the change in the cost of equity stemming from a marginal change in the
tax rate under consideration. Similar to Keuschnigg and dietz (2004) or Keuschnigg
(1991), we compute the percentage change in the cost of equity analogous to: c ref ≡
dref/ref,w h e r edref denotes the deviation from the initial value of ref.T h e r e l a t i v e
16Figure 3: Increase in the Imputed Return under ACE/ACNE
change in the particular tax rate is then deﬁned as ˆ τ ≡ dτ / (1 − τ) to avoid division by




1 − τG,f ⇒ c ref = d τG,f. (14)
According to eq. (14), under the CBIT the cost of equity is only aﬀected by the capital
gains tax, such that a one-percentage point increase in the capital gains tax rate also leads
to a one-percentage point increase in the cost of equity capital.
Under the ACE/ACNE, besides the capital gains tax, the proﬁtt a xa n dt h el e v e lo f
the imputed return can also induce a preference for either debt or equity ﬁnance. While a
higher capital gains tax increases the cost of equity capital and thus induces a preference
for debt ﬁnance (as a result the debt asset ratio b increases), an increase in the proﬁtt a x
will reduce the cost of equity capital. Accordingly, a larger proﬁtt a xr a t ew i l ls t i m u l a t e
17a preference for equity ﬁnance, implying a reduction in the debt asset ratio:
d(ref − τP,fiE)
dτG,f > 0, (15)
d(ref − τP,fiE)
dτP,f < 0. (16)
Under the ACE/ACNE, the overall eﬀect on the ﬁnancial behavior resulting from an
increase in the proﬁt tax rate is, however, less clear cut. On the one hand, the increase
in the proﬁt tax rate reduces the cost of equity as already discussed, on the other hand,
it also reduces the cost of debt since debt interest is also tax deductible. Therefore, the
dominating eﬀect will depend on the relative diﬀerence between the imputed return and
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t eo nﬁrm debt. If both are equal, both sources of ﬁnance are aﬀe c t e di na n
identical way. However, if the imputed return is higher (lower) than the return on debt,
there will be a preference for equity (debt) ﬁnance.
Similar to an increase in the proﬁt tax rate, a larger imputed return on equity capital
ensures a reduction in the cost of equity capital, too:
d(ref − τP,fiE)
diE < 0. (17)
Therefore, the higher the imputed return which can be deducted from the tax base, the
lower the cost of equity and thus the higher the preference for equity ﬁnance will be.27
The debt asset ratio, b, accordingly declines (see also Figure 3).
3.4 Investment Behavior
Combining the expression for the shadow price of capital (9b) with the envelope condition
for the co-state variable capital (10a) and substituting in equation (11), which determines
the optimal use of debt, the cost of capital can be expressed as the weighted sum of the
cost of equity capital and external capital, where the debt asset ratio, bf, serves as a
27A detailed discussion on the magnitude of the imputed return in practice can be found in Keen and
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Without taxes, the marginal investment must oﬀer a rate of return at least equal to
t h ei n t e r e s tr a t e ,F
f
K − δ = iBH. With taxation, the cost of capital changes as shown in
the above equation. The ﬁrst term on the right hand side indicates the cost of equity
ﬁnance. In case an ACE/ACNE prevails, namely if z2 =1 , the cost of equity is reduced
by the amount of the tax advantage of the ACE/ACNE. The second term, the cost of
debt ﬁnance consists of interest payments plus the agency cost.28
Inserting the relevant parameters for corporate ﬁrms into eq. (18) we can derive the
following cost of capital formula for ﬁrms belonging to the corporate sector under the
present tax schedule prevailing in Germany29:
F
C




P,C(1 − bC)+( i
BH + mC)bC (20)
It is straightforward since we assumed the ‘New View’ of dividend taxation to apply,
that only the capital gains and the proﬁtt a xr a t ea ﬀect the cost of capital.
28The propensity to invest also depends on the tax allowance for investments, z3, which is included in
γI,f and reduces the actual tax burden if z3 > 0.
29Remember that γD,C = θD,CθP,C
θG,C and γI,C = θD,C
θG,C as well as ΩC = θD,C
θG,C .M o r e o v e rw ea s s u m eβ =0
indicating that there are no new share issues and that depreciation follows economic depreciation, z3 =0 .
Furthermore, we allow for the debt interest deductibility so z1 =1and we disregard any allowance for
corporate equity so z2 =0 :
19CBIT
If we analyze the eﬀect of the CBIT on the cost of capital of either sector ﬁrm, both z1
and z2 have to be set equal to zero. Under this constellation of parameters the above cost
of capital formula changes to:
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θP,NθG,N
(22)
Capital Accumulation under the CBIT
As expected, the overall cost of capital increase under the CBIT, since incurred interest
on debt is no longer tax deductible and hence the cost of debt ﬁnance is raised. Figure 4
illustrates the eﬀect of introducing a CBIT on capital accumulation. The optimal capital
stock is given by the intersection of the downward sloping marginal product curve with
the cost of capital represented by the horizontal line.
20Introducing a CBIT, the horizontal cost of capital line shifts upwards. Due to the
higher cost of capital a lower number of proﬁtable investments which oﬀer the minimum
required rate of return are available. As a consequence, less investments will be carried
out, implying that each ﬁrm operates at a lower capital intensity. Overall, a capital
decumulation in the economy will occur. If we additionally allow for an immediate write-
oﬀ such that z
f
3 =1we see that such a provision leads to a decline in the cost of capital
of both ﬁrm types and, assuming no agency cost of debt and equal rates of return across
diﬀerent asset types, such a scenario also leads to investment neutrality (see eq. (22)).
It is in such a situation that the advantage of a CGE model become most clear. The
simple comparative static does not show us which of the two opposite eﬀects, the tax base
broadening or the generous depreciation allowances will in the end prevail.
For the following comparative static analysis we ignore the possibility of external
equity ﬁnance for corporate ﬁr m sa sw e l la st h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fa n yi m m e d i a t ew r i t eo ﬀ for
both types of ﬁrms implying β =0and z
f
3 =0 .
Diﬀerentiating the ﬁrm speciﬁc cost of capital formulae for corporate and non-corporate
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dτ P,N = rV
(1−τP,N)2(1 − bN)+ τP,NiBH
(1−τP,N)2bN > 0,
(23)
we ﬁnd that reducing the corporate income tax and the personal income tax, re-
spectively, has a positive impact on investment, because in each case the cost of capital
declines.30
The economic implication of a decrease in the corporate tax rate is straight-forward.
If the corporate tax rate decreases, returns stemming from real investments are more
heavily taxed compared to those from a ﬁnancial investment which is not subject to the
corporate tax rate. Hence, the cost of capital declines resulting in more real investments.
T h es i z eo ft h i se ﬀect will be larger for ﬁrms endowed with much equity and smaller for
highly indebted ﬁrms.
30Since we also assume that the debt asset ratio is optimally chosen, a marginal change in a tax rate
has no inﬂuence on the optimal debt asset ratio which enters the cost of capital formula.
21ACE
In order to analyze the arising eﬀects if we introduce an ACE/ACNE, we have to set both
































































Accordingly, the cost of capital for each type of ﬁrm declines by the amount τP,f
θP,f (1−bf)iE
if an ACE/ACNE is considered. In Figure 5 the optimal capital stock is again given
by the intersection of the downward sloping marginal product curve with the horizontal
cost of capital line. In case we introduce an ACE/ACNE, the cost of capital line shifts
downwards.
Capital Accumulation under the ACE/ACNE
22Therefore, under the ACE/ACNE the minimal required return an investment project
has to earn declines implying that an increasing number of proﬁtable investments are
available. Consequently, capital accumulates and we will end up with a larger total stock
of capital of K0 in the economy.
For the comparative static analysis we again disregard external equity as a source of
ﬁnance as well the possibility of an immediate write-oﬀ, implying β =0and z
f
3 =0 .
Diﬀerentiating the cost of capital formulae given in (25) with respect to the corporate
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dτ P,N = rV N
(1−τP,N)2(1 − bN) − iE
(1−τP,N)2(1 − bN) > 0.
(26)
An increase in the corporate or personal income tax rate increases the cost of capital for
the respective ﬁrm, while a reduction of these tax rates results in a decline in the ﬁrm
speciﬁc cost of capital.
Moreover, under an ACE type of tax system, the cost of capital crucially depends on




di E = −
τP,C
θ
P,C(1 − bC) < 0 (27)
According to the above equation, the higher the chosen imputed rate on equity capital,
the lower the cost of capital will be due to the narrower tax base.
The remaining buildings blocks of a CGE model, in particular the household as well
as the rest of the world, are not considered in detail here, since they are only of minor
importance for the theoretical underpinning or the interpretation of the simulation results.
The model documentation is completed by the government sector to show in which way
the CBIT and the ACE/ACNE aﬀects government revenues.
31For the ACE/ACNE we assume that rV >i E such that the imputed return is lower than the net
return on equity (assumed here to be eight per cent).
233.5 Public Accounts
The government collects revenue from taxing corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms, dividend,
interest and labor income as well as capital gains and consumption. Total governmental













τP,f[Y f − Jf − wfLf − δKf − mfBf
−z1iBHBf − z2iE(Kf − Bf) − z3INf],
Ti = τi £
iBHAB,H + iHADH,H + iFADF,H¤
.
(28)
Business income taxes, TP, consist of corporate and personal income tax of domestic
corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms TP,C +TP,N.I nc a s ez1 and z2 are set equal to one, so
when both debt interest and the imputed return on equity are tax deductible, the proﬁt
tax base will shrink and accordingly also government revenues.
Moreover, ﬁrms pay interest on debt plus an agency cost (iBH +mf)Bf while private
households just receive the gross interest on debt, namely iBHAB,H . Taxable interest
income is taxed at rate τi and the corresponding interest tax base comprises interest
income on domestic ﬁrm bonds AB,H as well as on domestic and foreign government
bonds, ADH,H and ADF,H .T h ev a r i a b l e siH and iF denote the gross interest on domestic
and foreign government bonds. Under the ACE/ACNE, the imputed return on equity
capital is not taxed separately on the household level. However, earnings on ﬁrm shares
are, depending on the scenario, subject to the dividend and capital gains tax.
The accumulation of public debt has to cover public consumption CG
t ,t h ep r i m a r y
deﬁcit and the interest spending on public debt (1+iH)DG
t . The primary deﬁc i ti sd e ﬁned
as the diﬀerence between lump-sum transfers TH










t − TTR t .( 2 9 )
24The government debt accumulation is intertemporally constrained. It rules out ex-
penditure increases to ﬁnance a budget deﬁcit. A present imbalance has to be oﬀset by a
future compensating action.
4 Simulation Results
This Section presents and interprets the simulation results. Starting from the present
German tax system we perform a number of simulations which depict either the introduc-
tion of an ACE/ACNE or of a CBIT. Revenue neutrality is assured either by a change
in the VAT or in the proﬁt tax. The scenarios can be ranked in the following way: the
best results are achieved when the CBIT is accompanied by an immediate write-oﬀ and
revenue neutrality is achieved by an exogenous change in the proﬁt tax. When the VAT
is adjusted to make sure that the government budget is balanced, the ACE/ACNE with
no additional capital gains taxation leads to the most signiﬁcant welfare gains.
Tables 1a and b summarize the status quo tax rates in Germany as well as the main
behavioral parameters applied in the calibration. These parameter values are all conﬁrmed
by empirical ﬁndings in the literature (see the references in brackets).
Table 1a: Statutory German Tax Rates (in %)
ProﬁtT a x ,τP,C / τP,NC 0.383 / 0.454
Tax on Interest Income, τi 0.443
Dividend Income Tax, τD 0.221
Capital Gains Tax, τG 0.00
Labor Income Tax, τL 0.295
VAT, τC 0.16
Source: German Ministry of Finance, own calculations.
25Table 1b: Behavioral Parameters
Economic Depreciation Rate 0.1
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (FLAIG 1988) 0.4
Elasticity of Debt-Asset Ratioa) (GORDON and LEE 2001) 0.36
Elasticity of Factor Substitution (GERMAN CENTRAL BANK 1995) 0.8
Labor supply elasticity (weighted average of FENGE et al. 2002) 0.37
a) Elasticity with respect to the proﬁtt a x .
In the German tax system prevailing in 2004, the statutory corporate tax rate amounts
to 25 per cent. Accounting also for the local trade tax and the solidarity surcharge,
however, the eﬀective corporate tax rate adds up to 38.3 per cent. On the household level,
theoretically all types of income, including capital and labor income are merged and then
taxed at a single progressive personal income tax rate which reaches a top marginal tax
rate of 42 per cent, or 44.3 per cent if we include the solidarity surcharge.32 In Germany,
diﬀerent kinds of capital income including dividends and capital gains face, however, a
speciﬁc tax treatment: Dividends are taxed according to the "half income principle"33,
implying a lower tax burden on dividend income and capital gains are completely tax
exempt.
The top personal income tax rate of 44.3 per cent just applies to interest income.
Regarding labour income taxation, we assume an average annual labor income of € 20,814
for the representative individual which translates into an average labor income tax rate
of 28 per cent, or 29.5 per cent if we add the solidarity surcharge.
32The income tax rate applying to non-corporate ﬁrms is 45.4 per cent since it also includes part of
the local trade tax.
33According to the German system of half imputation, only half of dividend payouts enter the tax
base when computing the personal income tax liability. Our modelling approach for this dividend tax
treatment, is to subject overall dividend income but only to half of the personal income tax rate.
26Table 2: Long Run Key Economic Figures (in %)#)
ACE/ACNE CBIT
Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.3 z3=0 z3=1∗)
GDP 9.1 2.9 2.2 -5.3 8.2
Capital Stock 20.5 9.6 8.4 -10.2 16.2
Labor Supply 1.7 -0.5 -1.1 -1.4 3.1
Disposable Income 6.5 5.3 5.6 -4.3 4.8
Domestic Consumption 4.6 -0.7 -0.3 -4.7 1.7
Change in VAT %-points + 5.1 + 6.5 +8.4 -1 . 3 -2 . 4
Welfare in % of Tot. Wealth 0.1 -1.1 -1.4 -1.2 0.06
Welfare in % of GDP 0.08 - 0.6 -0.8 -0.7 0.04
#) Revenue neutrality via change in VAT; ∗) z3=1 stands for
immediate write-oﬀ. Sc.1: tg=0%, td=22%;
Sc. 2: tg=22%,td=44%; Sc. 3: tg=td=22%. Source: Own calculations.
Table 2 depicts the ﬁrst simulation results assuming that revenue neutrality is achieved
via an adjustment in the VAT rate. We assume the imputed return on equity equals debt
interest of six per cent to ensure neutrality with respect to the source of ﬁnance. Moreover,
we run three diﬀerent simulation scenarios with respect to introducing an ACE/ACNE.
Scenario 1 assumes just the ACE/ACNE is introduced and only addresses the problem
of ﬁnancial neutrality at ﬁrm level. The taxation at personal level remains unchanged,
implying a zero tax on capital gains and a tax of around 22 per cent on dividend income.
However, under such a reform, interest income is still taxed on the personal level at the
personal income tax rate. Therefore, to ensure there is no bias in investing in ﬁrm shares
vis-à-vis ﬁrm bonds, both types of earnings have to be treated in similar ways on personal
level. This is why Scenarios 2 and 3 apply in addition a capital gains tax of 22 per cent.34
In Scenario 2 the dividend tax equals the tax on interest income of 44.3 per cent while
in Scenario 3 the half-income principle still holds, meaning that the dividend tax equals
22 per cent. For the CBIT reform proposal, we also consider two alternatives. The ﬁrst
34Since capital gains are only taxable upon realization and not upon accrual only half of the personal
income tax rate is taken as a rule of thumb in the simulation exercise
27case regards solely the introduction of a CBIT as usually stipulated in the literature.
However, to ensure investment neutrality, one can also design a reform which in addition
to the CBIT introduces provisions for immediate write-oﬀ. This situation is depicted in
the last column of Table 2.
As opposed to the usual assumptions made in the literature, we do not apply for
these ﬁrst simulations an adjustment in the proﬁt tax to ensure revenue neutrality since
there are also other taxes at hand, such as the consumption tax, which can be increased
(decreased) in case the tax revenue shrinks (rises) after the policy shock.
From Table 2 we can see that, given the present tax constellation, introducing an
allowance for both corporate and non-corporate equity accompanied by the half-income
principle of dividend taxation on household side achieves the best results. Due to the pos-
sibility to deduct an imputed return from the proﬁt tax base the cost of capital decreases
and accordingly investments and capital accumulation rise. The capital stock increases
by around 20 per cent for the whole economy inducing an increase in labour demand of
corporate ﬁrms by ﬁve per cent and an increase in aggregate labour supply of 1.7 per
cent. The results are driven by the reduction in the cost of capital which decreases by
6.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent for the corporate and non-corporate sector respectively (see
Table 3a). Since this reform scenario is rather costly, the VAT has to be increased in the
long-run SS by nearly ﬁve percentage points to to ensure revenue neutrality. Thus, the
positive welfare eﬀects induced by the increased capital accumulation and labour demand
are counterbalanced by the rather large increase in the VAT. Therefore, overall welfare
rises by only 0.1 per cent in terms of life-time wealth.
The second best alternative is the CBIT combined with a provision for immediate
write-oﬀ. Even though the cost of capital decline under this constellation turns out very
large, the non-corporate sector faces a capital decumulation. The large demand for capital
by the corporate sector following the drastic cost of capital reduction by almost 39 per
cent combined with the sheer size of the corporate sector crowds out investments by the
non-corporate sector. Thus, the overall increase in the capital stock of 16 per cent will
be smaller compared to ACE/ACNE Scenario 1. Accordingly, the welfare eﬀects turn out
28less positive as well even though the reform raises more revenue from the proﬁtt a xs u c h
that the VAT can even be lowered by 2.4 percentage points in the long-run SS (see Table
2).
The comparison of these two reform scenarios raises the question whether the positive
results arise due to a shift of the tax burden via the VAT to the less elastic labour supply.
T h i si so n ep o s s i b l ee x p l a n a t i o n ,h o w e v e r ,w eh a v et ok e e pi nm i n dt h a to nt h eo n eh a n d
the VAT just distorts the labour-leisure decision by aﬀecting current real wages. On the
other hand, the proﬁt tax or the interest income tax are more harmful for the economy. A
high corporate tax leads in a world of high capital mobility to capital ﬂight, to decreasing
capital intensity and a resulting decline in the marginal productivity of labour. Domestic
real wages go down such that in the end the burden of the corporate tax is ﬁnally borne
by labour. All these implicit negative eﬀects can thus be avoided if the tax burden is
shifted from the corporate to the consumption tax.
Table 3a: Change in the Cost of Capital and the EMTR
ACE/ACNE CBIT
C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm
Cost of Cap. (pre/post reform) 10.6 / 9.9 9.9 / 9.5 10.6 / 11.6 9.9 / 12.0
% - age Change -6.3 -4.3 9.7 21.8
EMTR (pre/post reform) 35.5 / 30.1 37.0 / 31.8 35.5 / 42.4 37.0 / 50.0
% - age Change -15.5 -14.2 19.3 35.0
Capital Stock (in %) 25 12.6 2.7 -33.3
Labor Demand (in %) 5 -4.3 11.1 -24.7
Source: Own calculations.
29Table 3b: Change in the Cost of Capital and the EMTR
ACE/ACNE CBIT
Sc.2 Sc.3 z3=1
C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm
Cap. Cost (pre/post reform) 10.6 / 12.1 9.9 / 9.4 10.6 / 12.3 9.9 / 9.6 10.6 / 8.4 9.9 / 9.
% - age Change 14.4 -4.5 16.0 -3.0 -21.0 -4.7
EMTR (pre/post reform) 35.5 / 42.6 37.0 /30.1 35.5 / 43.2 37.0 /32.9 35.5 / 21.8 37.0 / 30
% - age Change 19.7 -17.7 21.5 -11.1 -38.8 -17.6
Capital Stock (in %) -21.4 65.1 -22.2 63.5 41.5 -29.2
Labor Demand (in %) -25.1 45.3 -25.6 44.5 23.0 -33.9
Source: Own calculations.
The above Tables also depict the results for implementing ACE/ACNE Scenarios 2 and
3. Under these scenarios the cost of capital for non-corporate ﬁrms declines, however, due
to the introduction of a capital gains tax of 22 per cent, investments ﬁnanced by retained
earnings are negatively aﬀected and thus the cost of capital for corporate ﬁrms increases
(see Table 3b).35 Therefore, as shown in Table 3a, even though capital accumulates within
the non-corporate sector, the economy-wide increase in the capital stock will only amount
to 9.6 and 8.4 per cent respectively. Thus, the negative eﬀects of the capital gains and the
dividend tax will demand an even larger increase in the VAT by 6.5 and 8.4 percentage
points respectively to ensure the government budget is balanced. Thus, labour supply
will decline and accordingly also domestic consumption leading to a decrease in welfare
in per cent of total wealth by 1.1 per cent in Scenario 2 and by 1.4 per cent in Scenario 3.
The pure CBIT which is not accompanied by a provision for immediate write-oﬀ does
not produce favorable results either. Since the advantage of debt interest deductibility
does not apply anymore, the cost of capital increases by around 10 per cent for corporate
ﬁrms and by around 22 per cent for non-corporate ones. As a result, the capital stock
decumulates for the entire economy by ten per cent. Thus, GDP also shrinks by 5.3 per
cent, labour demand declines and accordingly gross wages and consumption. Therefore,
35Remember that non-corporate ﬁrms can not rely on retained earnings as a source of ﬁnance and can
just draw on external dbt and new share issues to ﬁnance new investments.
30this reform even induces a decline in welfare by 1.2 per cent in terms of life-time income or
0.7 per cent of GDP. This negative outcome occurs even though as a result of the increased
proﬁt tax revenue, a lower VAT of namely 14.7 per cent compared to the former 16 per
cent is suﬃcient to ensure revenue neutrality. The negative impact on the accumulation
of capital and accordingly on gross wages (assuming the same proﬁt tax rate prevails after
the reform as well) is so large that it can not be compensated by a lower consumption tax.
Once again the harmful consequences of proﬁt taxation compared to the rather modest
positive eﬀects triggered by lower consumption taxation are striking.
The simulation which envisages the introduction an ACE/ACNE ﬁnanced by an ex-
ogenous increase in the proﬁt tax rate shows that this rate can not be high enough to
compensate for the costs of the reform since even at very large values transfers to house-
holds still decrease.36 This result occurs since our dynamic general equilibrium model
captures a wide range of eﬀects and economy-wide repercussions and a high proﬁtt a x
rate will have a substantial negative eﬀect on investments, capital accumulation, GDP
and labour demand thus shrinking the tax base of the other taxes as well and requiring
an adjustment in transfers to ﬁnance such a reform. If we performed our analysis in
a two-period framework, in which only the second period budget needs to be balanced,
the simulations show that the introduction of the ACE/ACNE Scenario 1 needs to be
accompanied either by an increase in the corporate tax rate to 53.5 per cent so by 15.2
percentage points or by a simultaneous increase in the tax rate on corporate proﬁts from
38.3 to 46.5 per cent and in the tax rate on non-corporate proﬁts from 45.4 to 54.5 per
cent other things being equal.
In case a CBIT without immediate write-oﬀ i si m p l e m e n t e di nat w op e r i o df r a m e w o r k ,
the possible reduction in tax rates which assure in the second period a balanced budget is
tremendous. A reduction of namely almost ten percentage points in both tax rates, leading
to a corporate tax of 27.5 per cent and a tax on non-corporate proﬁts of 35.5 per cent leads
to the same overall tax revenue as before. The same balanced budget is achieved if just
the corporate tax rate is reduced to 20.5 per cent other things being equal. Nevertheless,
36In case the VAT rate is kept constant, the government budget is balanced via a change in the lump-
sum transfers to households.
31once again such a computation neglects the economy-wide repercussions which can be
captured by our dynamic general equilibrium model. The strength of this model consists
in exactly this particular computation and evaluation of the overall eﬀects of a tax reform.
Finally, the last simulations performed take into account this time an exogenous ad-
justment in the corporate tax as a means to ensure revenue neutrality. Therefore, a
uniform tax of 38 (30) per cent on non-corporate and corporate proﬁts is required to
balance the public sector budget in case the CBIT is introduced without (with) imme-
diate write-oﬀ. Removing the advantage of debt interest deductibility accompanied by a
reduced proﬁt tax rate brings about the following results:
Table 4: Long Run Key Economic Figures (in %)
CBIT
z3=0#) z3=1∗)
Total C-Firm N-Firm Total C-Firm N-Firm
Cost of Cap.(pre/post reform) 10.6 / 11.8 9.9 / 6.1 10.6 / 8.1 9.9 / 8.4
% - age Change 11.4 -38.4 -23.5 -15.0
EMTR (pre/post reform) 35.5 / 42.7 37.0 / -0.8 35.5 / 16.3 37.0 / 21.3
% - age Change 20.3 -100.0 -54.2 -42.4
GDP -4.9 9.7
Capital Stock -8.9 -9.9 -7.3 20.1 35.5 -7.7
Labor Demand -1.6 -2.5 -0.04 3.0 14.7 -18.6
Disposable Income -3.2 7.1
Domestic Consumption -4.9 4.6
Welfare in % of Total Wealth -1.3 0.3
Welfare in % of GDP -0.8 0.2
Revenue neutrality via change in the proﬁtt a x;#) tu=38%; ∗)tu=30% . Source: Own calculations.
Of course, these results may change if a CBIT is accompanied c.p. by a reduction in
the corporate tax or in the tax rate on non-corporate proﬁts solely.
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 4 show the results of implementing a pure CBIT
without any special depreciation allowances. The overall message is clear: Even though
32the usual line presented in the literature states that a CBIT might have positive eﬀects
because of the lower proﬁt tax rates which apply and which constitute a positive signal
for investors, the simulation results show that the overall eﬀect on the cost of capital
for corporate ﬁr m si sn e g a t i v es i n c et h ep o s t - r e f o r mu n i f o r mp r o ﬁtt a xw h i c he n s u r e s
revenue neutrality is still rather high. The new tax level is however lower for the non-
corporate sector such that ﬁrms belonging to this sector face a cost of capital decline.
Nevertheless, the overall capital stock declines in the long-run since the corporate sector
is the key driving force due to its considerably larger size. The picture changes when we
allow for immediate write-oﬀ. In this case, as shown in columns 4-6 in Table 4, there is
a tremendous decline in capital costs which leads to an increase in capital accumulation.
The long-run SS capital stock increases by 20 per cent, leading to an increase in labour
demand by three per cent. As a result wages will rise and accordingly also disposable
income and consumption. Therefore, the increase in welfare of 0.3 per cent in terms of
t o t a lw e a l t hi se v e nh i g h e rt h a ni nc a s et h eA C ES c e n a r i o1ﬁnanced by an increase in
the VAT (see Table 2).
5 Sensitivity Analysis
Lastly, Section 4 presents the sensitivity analysis which, as in all types of simulations
performed with dynamic CGE models, is of crucial importance. In our case, it is among
other things, the debt asset ratio, the corporate tax rate and the imputed return on equity
which inﬂuence our results and which in the following will be considered in more detail.
Thus, given the above eﬀects, it is interesting to see how such policy shocks aﬀect eco-
nomic aggregates if we start from a comparatively lower tax rate instead of the present
corporate tax rate of 38.3 per cent on corporate proﬁts. Such an experiment is of in-
terest for countries like the new EU Member States which are characterized by much
lower corporate tax rates and for which accordingly diﬀerent reform scenarios might be
appealing.
33Table 5: Long Run Key Economic Figures (in %)#)
ACE/ACNE CBIT
Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.3 z3=0 z3=1∗)
GDP 5.5 0.7 0.5 -3.9 5.0
Capital Stock 12.9 4.5 4.2 -6.5 9.9
Labor Supply 0.6 -1.2 -1.5 -1.0 2.0
Disposable Income 6.8 3.8 4.2 -3.1 3.0
Domestic Consumption 2.9 -2.9 -1.9 -3.4 -0.5
Change in VAT %-points 5.5 6.7 7.9 -1.3 -1.6
Welfare in % of Tot. Wealth -0.5 -1.1 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4
Welfare in % of GDP -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 -0.6 -0.2
#) Revenue neutrality via change in VAT; reduced proﬁt tax of 25%;
∗) z3=1 stands for immediate write-oﬀ. Sc.1: tg=0%, td=22%;
Sc.2: tg=22%,td=44%; Sc.3: tg=td=22% . Source: Own calculations.
For instance, starting from an overall statutory tax rate on corporate proﬁts of 25 per
cent the picture changes as depicted in Tables 5, 6a and 6b. In this case, even under
an ACE/ACNE Scenario 1 welfare decreases by around 0.3 per cent of GDP because the
additional advantage of being able to deduct an imputed return from the proﬁtt a xb a s e
(which is now lower than in case we start from a higher proﬁtt a x )i sm o r et h a no ﬀset by
the disadvantage of the higher VAT of 21.5 per cent required to ﬁnance the reform. The
increase in the corporate sector cost of capital is now even larger under Scenarios 2 and 3
such that the increase long-run capital accumulation of 4.5 and 4.2 per cent respectively
is more modest than before. Thus, it is not astonishing that the even larger increase in
the VAT needed to ﬁnance the reform will in the end trigger considerable losses in welfare
(see Table 5).
34Table 6a: Change in the Cost of Capital and the EMTR
ACE/ACNE
Sc.1 Sc.2 Sc.3
C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm
Cap. Cost (pre/post reform) 9.1 / 8.9 9.9 / 9.4 9.1 /10.8 9.9 / 9.4 9.1 /10.7 9 . 9/9 .
% - age Change -2.6 -4.7 18.4 -4.7 17.6 -3.4
EMTR (pre / post reform) 25.1 / 21.7 37.0 / 31.3 25.1 /35.4 37.0 / 30.2 25.1 /34.9 37.0 / 30
% - age Change -13.4 -15.5 41.2 -18.6 39.0 -12.9
Capital Stock (in %) -2 41.5 -39.4 89.4 -37.2 84.2
Labor Demand (in %) -11.4 22.9 -39.0 69.0 -37.1 64.6
Source: Own calculations.
Table 6b: Change in the Cost of Capital and the EMTR
CBIT
z3=0 z3=1
C-Firm N-Firm C-Firm N-Firm
Cost of Capital (pre / post reform) 9.1 / 9.6 9.9 / 12.0 9.1 / 8.0 9.9 / 9.0
% - age Change 5.0 21.5 -11.9 -9.0
EMTR (pre / post reform) 25.1 / 29.8 37.0 / 49.8 25.1 / 16.6 37.0 / 26.9
% - age Change 18.7 34.5 -33.7 -27.5
Capital Stock (in %) 11.0 -40.2 13.3 3.2
Labor Demand (in %) 16.4 -33.4 4.9 -3.5
Source: Own calculations.
A ss h o w ni nT a b l e s5a n d6 b ,t h eC B I Tw i t hn oi m m e d i a t ew r i t e - o ﬀ the leads under
the new tax constellation to slightly better results than in the base scenario. As we start
from a lower corporate tax, the disadvantage from the lack of debt interest deductibility
is now less severe. The cost of capital increases by about 5 and 21 per cent respectively
for corporate and non-corporate ﬁrms inducing a decline in the overall capital stock of
6.5 per cent (see Table 5). Gross wages and thus disposable income and consumption
decline resulting in a decrease in welfare by 0.6 per cent in terms of GDP. If the CBIT is
35implemented in combination with a provision for immediate write-oﬀ, the increase in tax
revenue is not as large as in the reform scenario starting from a 38 per cent proﬁtt a x .
Thus, the long-run SS VAT tax can only be reduced by 1.6 percentage points (see Table
5) and thus the reform leads to an overall slight welfare loss of 0.2 per cent in terms of
GDP.
An additional question to be asked is what happens in case the imputed return diﬀers
from the interest rate paid on debt, such that neutrality with respect to the source of
ﬁnance is not guaranteed anymore. For the sensitivity analysis we assume this presumptive
return equals the risk-free interest rate on government debt of three per cent, thus being
lower than the interest paid on ﬁrm debt. Taking the ACE/ACNE Scenario 1 where no
tax on capital gains applies as an example, the results change in the following way:
Table 7: Long Run Key Economic Figures (in %)
ACE/ACNE Sc.1#) Total C-Firm N-Firm
Cost of Capital (pre/post reform) 10.6 / 9.6 9.9 / 9.0
% - age Change -9.3 -8.7
EMTR (pre/post reform) 35.5 / 28.5 37.0 / 30.1
% - age Change -19.9 -18.8
GDP 3.4
Capital Stock 7.5 8.9 5.0
Labor Demand 0.7 1.9 -1.4
Disposable Income 3.4
Domestic Consumption 2.6
Increase in VAT %-points 1.7
Welfare in % of Total Wealth / GDP 0.3 / 0.1
#) revenue neutrality via change in VAT; imputed return < interest rate on debt;
Source: Own calculations.
Even though this alternative does not equalize the cost of capital across the diﬀerent
sources of ﬁnance, the overall induced macroeconomic eﬀe c t sa r eh i g h e rt h a ni nt h ep r e -
vious case (see Table 3). As a lower return is deducted from the tax base, the revenue
36loss turns out to be smaller. Therefore, the required increase in the VAT rate to balance
the government budget is lower, thus leading to slightly higher welfare results.37
Finally, a last sensitivity analysis is performed with respect to the debt asset ratio.
This parameter is of particular importance for the CBIT reform alternative because it
inﬂuences the eﬀects of such a reform to a large extent. Accordingly, in some countries
ﬁrms which are characterized by a lower debt asset ratio suﬀer less from such a reform since
the lost advantage of debt interest deductibility is less considerable. Table 8 summarizes
the results of the sensitivity analysis which accounts for a debt asset ratio of only 18 per
cent for corporate ﬁrms and 27.5 per cent for non-corporate ﬁrms, thus one half of the
debt asset ratios used in the base case. We assume the reform is ﬁnanced by a change in
the VAT.
Table 8: Long Run Key Economic Figures (in %)#)
CBIT
z3=0 z3=1
Total C-Firm N-Firm Total C-Firm N-Firm
Cost of Cap. (pre/post reform) 10.6 / 12.5 9.9 /13.6 10.6 / 8.5 9.9 /9.3
% - age Change 18.9 38.9 -18.8 -5.2
EMTR (pre/post reform) 35.5 / 41.2 37.0 / 48.1 35.5 / 15.8 37.0 / 22.1
% - age Change 17.2 32.1 -55.2 -39.4
GDP -3.7 15.4
Capital Stock -6.5 0.9 -20.5 30.9 37.8 17.7
Labor Demand -1.3 5.8 -14.5 5.8 10.9 -3.7
Disposable Income -2.3 8.9
Domestic Consumption -4.1 10.2
Change in VAT %-points 0.7 -5.0
Welfare in % of Total Wealth -1.2 1.8
Welfare in % of GDP -0.7 1.0
Note: #) revenue neutrality via change in VAT; Source: Own calculations.
37For the CBIT such a reform alternative does not inﬂuence the results since no imputed return on
equity can be deducted.
37The ﬁrst three columns of Table 8 depict the results for a CBIT without immediate
write-oﬀ. Compared to the baseline simulation results presented in Table 2, the changes
in most of the macroeconomic variables do not diﬀer much. As shown in Table 8, the
tax base broadening leads to less revenue than before since the debt asset ratio is now
lower. Therefore, a slight increase in the VAT of 0.7 per cent is now required to balance
the government budget. Nevertheless, the loss in welfare is as high as in Table 2. As
opposed to this, if the CBIT is accompanied by a provision for immediate write-oﬀ,t h e
reform produces even larger positive eﬀects. The cost of not allowing for debt interest
deductibility is now smaller and therefore the considerable capital accumulation of 15.4
per cent has positive eﬀects on the whole economy. The reform leads to higher revenues
from the taxation of corporate and non-corporate proﬁts such that the long-run VAT can
be even reduced by ﬁve percentage points. The overall welfare gain amounts to one per
cent in terms of GDP.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The aim of this paper was to discuss two main reform alternatives of corporate income
taxation. On the one hand, the ACE as suggested by the IFS Capital Taxes Group
which provides for the reduction of an imputed return on equity from the proﬁtt a x
base and on the other hand the CBIT that abolishes the preferential debt treatment by
eliminating debt interest deductibility. Both policy scenarios align the cost of capital for
investments ﬁnanced by debt or equity. Under the ACE the tax base of the proﬁtt a x
becomes narrower such that opponents of this reform argue a higher corporate tax rate is
necessary to guarantee a certain tax revenue; this outcome is however, not desirable for a
small open economy in a world of high capital mobility where the proﬁt tax rate acts as a
signalling device. Nevertheless, if we assume the reforms are ﬁnanced by a change in the
VAT rate and not in the proﬁt tax rate, our simulation results show that introducing an
ACE/ACNE with no additional capital gains tax on personal level, has signiﬁcant positive
eﬀects for investment, capital accumulation and welfare. For the opposite reform scenario,
the CBIT, the results turn out to be less favorable. Here, the cost of capital rises and
38induces negative consequences for investment. Firms will reduce their labour demand,
gross wages will decrease and even though a lower VAT rate applies this is not enough
to compensate the negative eﬀects of the reform. However, if the CBIT is accompanied
by a provision for immediate write-oﬀ to ensure investment neutrality, the eﬀects of such
a scenario are also positive. Moreover, if we allow for this second reform scenario for an
exogenous adjustment in the proﬁt tax instead of the VAT to ﬁnance the reform, the CBIT
accompanied by immediate write-oﬀ achieves the best results. For the implementation of
the ACE/ACNE, an exogenous increase in the proﬁt tax is not high enough to ﬁnance
such a reform in a dynamic general equilibrium framework since in every time period the
ACE/ACNE is deducted against the higher proﬁt tax and therefore the deﬁcit does not
shrink at all. Additionally, the higher proﬁtt a xr a t e sh a v en e g a t i v ee ﬀects on capital
accumulation and thus on labor demand and on other macroeconomic variables. A rise in
the proﬁt tax rate solely is therefore insuﬃcient due to these substantial negative economy-
wide repercussions and needs to be accompanied either by a reduction in transfers or an
increase in the VAT to ensure a balanced public sector budget.
Scenarios 2 and 3 of the ACE/ACNE in addition also implement a capital gains tax of
22 per cent on personal level to provide for a comparable treatment of the diﬀerent types
of capital income. This particular tax has negative eﬀects on the cost of capital and thus
on capital accumulation within the corporate sector. This results from our modelling
approach. We implement namely the "New View" of dividend taxation. Accordingly,
retentions are the marginal source of ﬁnance for investments in the corporate sector and
thus a high capital gains tax will raise the cost of capital and lead to capital decumulation
within this sector which accounts for 2/3 of the economy’s capital stock.
To avoid the double taxation of interest income under the CBIT reform proposal, one
could envisage the abolishment of interest income taxation on household level. Neverthe-
less, under these circumstances, policy makers would have to think of whether to extend
this generous treatment of interest income only to income received from domestic ﬁrm
bonds or to domestic and foreign government bonds as well. Even though we do not quan-
tify this last simulation exercise in this paper, the overall eﬀects will depend on which of
the two opposite eﬀects will prevail. The positive eﬀects of no interest income taxation
39face the negative eﬀects of a higher VAT or a lower decline in the proﬁtt a xw h i c hm i g h t
be necessary to compensate the revenue loss.
Finally, the sensitivity analysis underlines the accuracy which policy makers should
put forward when designing a reform proposal. The outcome of the diﬀerent scenarios are
very sensitive with regard to the choice of the imputed return, the calibrated debt asset
ratio or the corporate tax rate. Therefore, the magnitude of these parameters is crucial
when deciding on one reform alternative or the other.
Overall, one can say that for the comparison and evaluation of these two diametrically
opposite reform alternatives it is very important to consider additional issues besides the
aspect of ﬁnancial neutrality on ﬁrm level. If in addition, an ACE/ACNE reform scenario
taxes capital gains and dividend on personal level as well, such that interest income
and earnings from owning ﬁrm shares are treated in a similar way, or, if a provision for
immediate write-oﬀ is also applied in case of a CBIT to ensure investment neutrality, the
results may change to a large extent. Thus, the ultimate decision on which scenario is
the best reform alternative depends on the concrete reform details and might also diﬀer
from country to country. Diﬀerent nations apply at present diﬀerent corporate tax rates,
their ﬁrms are characterized by diﬀerent debt asset ratios, the macroeconomic background
diﬀe r sf r o mc a s et oc a s ea n dt h u so n ec a nn o tm a k ea c r o s s - t h eb o a r dr e c o m m e n d a t i o n sb u t
understand that the most appropriate reform scenario depends on the given circumstances.
40Appendix
A1 Corporate Firms
Since we refer to a mature economy, characterized by mature ﬁrms38, we follow the ‘New
View’ of dividend taxation.39 This is one approach used in the corporate ﬁnance literature
to characterize the relationship between taxes and the cost of capital40. Accordingly, div-
idends DivC are determined residually (Sinn, 1987). The marginal source of ﬁnance will
be retained earnings πC − DivC and the marginal use of funds, dividend payout. There-
fore, since dividend taxes avoided today by ﬁnancing investments via retained earnings
can be set against as the future dividend tax payments, dividend taxes will not aﬀect the
cost of capital at all. Thus, dividend taxes are neutral with respect to the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancing
decision.
Keeping in mind the empirical evidence provided by Auerbach and Hasset (2003)41,
who state that both views on the eﬀects of dividend taxation are valid, we determine new
share issues by VNC
t = β(1−z3τPf)INC
t . This approach is similar to Fehr (1999). New
investments are largely ﬁnanced by retained earnings or by new debt BNC and only a
ﬁxed fraction, β,o fﬁve per cent is ﬁnanced via new share issues. However, this approach
does not apply to non-corporate ﬁrms, because these have to rely on external equity to
ﬁnance investments
Plugging eq.(3) into the ﬂow of funds equation, we derive an explicit expression for
38 According to the nucleus theory the nucleus is incorporated in the ﬁrst step and then a phase of
internal growth sets in. During this phase, no dividends are paid, nor are any new shares issued, but all
proﬁts are retained to ﬁnance proﬁtable investments. After the nucleus has reached its stage of maturity,
proﬁts are distributed as dividends. The dividend tax discriminates against the initial size of the nucleus;
thus in the set-up phase, the ‘Old View’ applies, but the dividend tax is neutral in the stage of maturity
according to the ‘New View’ of dividend taxation (Sinn 1991).
39This hypothesis on the eﬀect of dividend taxation was developed among others by Auerbach (1979),
Bradford (1981) and Sinn (1987). In contrast, the ‘Old View’ of dividend taxation assumes that
shareholders prefer dividend distributions due to their so-called signalling function, because of a certain
cash preference or since they desire to reduce managerial discretion over the use of proﬁts. For a detailed
discussion on the ‘Old’ and ‘New View’ of dividend taxation see also Sinn (1990), Sørensen (1995) and
Zodrow (1991).
40The cost of capital is deﬁned as the minimum pre-tax rate of return generated by an investment if it
is to be undertaken.
41Further empirical evaluations of these two speciﬁcations were performed in an econometric study by
Poterba and Summers (1983) and by applying a dynamic CGE model by Hutton and Kenc (1998).
41dividends DivC as output Y C less labor costs wCLC, interest payments iBHBC, new shares
VNC
t ,d e p r e c i a t i o nδKC and corporate tax payments:
DivC = θ
P,C £
Y C − JC − mCBC − wCLC − δKC¤
− (1 − z1τP,C)iBHBC
+ BNC + z2τP,CrKC − z2τP,CrBC −
£




Again, the precise constellation of the parameters z1 and z2 allow us to model the
present German tax system or a reform proposal which introduces an ACE or a CBIT. In
equilibrium, the return on equity has to equal the net of tax dividend payment and the



































t is the investor’s required return that is necessary if the investor should be
willing to hold the asset. This return is higher than the net return on ﬁrm or government
bonds (iBH) since it includes a risk premium.
Introducing the two tax factors γD,C = θD,CθP,C






z3τP,C) as well as ΩC = θD,C
θG,C, the formula for χC












θP,C z2τP,CrBC − γI,C(IC − δKC).
(32)
A2 Non-Corporate Firms
As opposed to corporate ﬁrms, a non-corporate ﬁrm has no possibility to ﬁnance invest-
ments out of retained earnings, since all proﬁts are distributed to the owner, implying
DivN = πN. This is true for they are considered as part of the entrepreneur’s income as
if these proﬁts were distributed.
Therefore, a non-corporate ﬁrm can only choose between new debt, BNN,a n dn e w
42equity injections, VNN,a sap o s s i b l es o u r c eo fﬁnance for its investments but is not able
to draw like a corporate ﬁrm on retentions.








































Introducing once again the two tax factors γD,N = θP,N
θG,N and γI,N =1− τP,N z3
θG,N as well











θP,N z2τP,NrBN − γI,N(IN − δKN).
(35)
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